


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SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 1, January 1990

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SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 1, January 1990

[The following is a translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal *SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA* published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

To Our Readers [not translated]

00000000 Moscow *SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA* in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to press 1 Dec 89) p 3

SOCIOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR THE ECONOMIC REFORM

In Expectation of Changes (Workers on the Situation at Industrial Enterprises)

905D0011B Moscow *SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA* in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to press 1 Dec 89) pp 4-20

[Article by Vladimir Yefimovich Gimpelson, candidate of economic sciences, science associate at the Institute for the International Workers Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is a permanent contributor to our journal. Vladimir Samuilovich Magun is a candidate of psychological sciences and senior science associate at the Institute for Socioeconomic Problems of Demography under the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Goskomtrud. He is a permanent contributor to our journal]

[Text] As of 1 January 1988, the Law Governing the State Enterprise (Association) [1] went into effect and this law, as is known, is aimed at broadening enterprise independence. In this same year production relations arose which were not envisaged by the mentioned legal enactment but had a much more radical effect in liberating the enterprises from the clutches of the administrative system [3] than the "first" and even the "second" models of cost accounting. This was the question of the leasing of the enterprise by the labor collective from the state (the so-called "third" model of cost accounting) [4]. The year 1988 also became a period of rapid development for the cooperatives which were completely economically independent business units with their legal status being set out in the Law Governing Cooperatives [2]. In endeavoring for maximum economic independence, certain of the operating state enterprises have also begun to be turned into cooperatives [5].

To what degree have all these transformations touched the rank-and-file workers? Have they felt the changes in their daily production life, and if so, what have these been? What is not to the liking of the workers in the current state of affairs in production and how have their

attitudes changed in comparison with the 1970s? Do the workers at present see unused reserves of the "human factor" and what further changes seem primary to them?

Let us turn to the materials of a sociological poll conducted in December 1988. (The poll was part of a series of studies carried out in 1988-1989 in Moscow and a number of other cities of the nation by the co-workers of the IMRD [Institute for the International Workers Movement] under the USSR Academy of Sciences following a program worked out by the authors and with their participation.) Of the 415 respondents, 196 were employed at two Moscow state enterprises (machine building and light industry) operating under the conditions of the "first" model of cost accounting which is minimal from the viewpoint of economic independence, and 219 at a cooperative plant producing electrical engineering products.

The cooperative plant under discussion was established on the basis of a former state enterprise. Presently, it leases from the ministry the fixed capital of the former state enterprise, gradually purchasing the capital as its own property; the plant will be completely purchased by the cooperative by 1995. The cooperative has assumed the fulfilling of the state order for the former state enterprise and above this works under contract. From its income it deducts into the budget that amount (around 3 million rubles) which the former plant paid to the state. The labor collective has remained here as it was before, that is, the one which was before the change in the plant's status. For this reason, the discrepancies in the opinions and views between the two groups of respondents are not related to the specific formation of the production collectives. By the moment of the poll, the state enterprises had been operating under the new economic conditions for approximately a year and the cooperative one for about 6 months.

The number of men and women questioned at the different types of enterprises varied. In order to consider these differences, we will make the analysis for four separate subgroups: men and women employed in the state enterprises (respectively I and II), men and women employed at the cooperative plant (respectively III and IV). The distribution of persons questioned by subgroups is as follows: 139 persons in I and 57 in II; 81 in III and 138 in IV.

What Has Already Changed

The subjective views of the changes can serve as an indicator for the real changes and an unique barometer of the economic reform. These views are also interesting in and of themselves, outside the dependence of how accurately they reflect reality. Certainly precisely an awareness of changes for the better supports the workers' trust in perestroika and strengthens their motivation for labor and participation in production management. The question by which these sensations were disclosed was worded as follows: "The economic reform has begun. As of this year, your enterprise is already operating under

the new management conditions. Do you feel changes?" Then individual elements of the production situation were listed, for example: "your earnings: a) have risen; b) have declined; c) remained unchanged" and so forth. In

Table 1, the replies by the respondents have been grouped depending upon whether they show the absence of changes, of changes for the better for the respondent or changes for the worse.

Table 1: Assessment by Respondents of Changes in Production Life, % of Number Questioned

Elements of Production Situation	State Enterprises						Cooperative Plant					
	Men			Women			Men			Women		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Workload	34	3	62	25	2	72	6	0	91	6	1	91
Satisfaction with earnings	50	22	26	28	28	42	52	32	14	41	46	4
Amount of earnings	51	38	10	44	25	32	35	62	0	22	70	4
Justness of wages	62	22	16	42	12	44	48	36	12	30	45	18
Wage fluctuations	66	14	19	40	25	33	59	15	22	46	18	30
Information on enterprise affairs	61	29	6	58	40	12	42	26	14	44	42	6
Participation of workers in resolving production questions	63	34	1	68	26	5	53	44	2	54	36	6
Supply of materials, raw products, stock	67	4	29	49	12	11	82	4	39	67	17	9
Attention of administration to worker needs	64	13	22	67	5	26	60	17	17	70	11	18
Relations in collective	64	27	7	77	10	12	62	22	16	72	9	16
Working conditions	75	4	20	56	14	30	82	7	10	83	3	11
Style and methods of leadership	75	12	12	70	14	16	64	22	11	67	17	7
Relations with immediate leader	70	23	5	81	12	7	74	17	9	72	17	8
Pace of developing new products	78	15	4	63	16	10	63	21	12	81	6	4
Pace of introducing new equipment and production methods	80	7	10	72	5	23	84	5	6	90	4	1
Work of social organizations	81	14	4	65	19	12	68	22	7	56	36	4
Orders of leadership	81	14	4	72	18	10	69	22	7	60	31	4

Key: 1—No changes; 2—Changes for better; 3—Changes for worse. In terms of workload and wage fluctuations: 2—Changed; 3—Rose.

Unfortunately, a majority of the workers has ascertained a lack of changes over the previous year for virtually all parameters (see Table 1). But all the same, very substantial aspects of the work related to the workload and earnings, in the opinion of many workers, in 1988 underwent marked changes. It is a question of the volume of the workload (from 65 to 92 percent of the respondents in the various subgroups noted changes, in the predominant majority of instances, an increase in the load), and on the amount of earnings (from 48 to 74 percent noticed changes, more often toward a rise) and the justness of wages (from 38 to 63 percent noticed changes, more often toward greater justness).¹

In addition, a marked (but not reaching 50 percent in any of the subgroups) portion of the workers also noted certain other changes (see Table 1). It was positive that over the previous year there was an improvement in the level of information provided to the workers on enterprise affairs, the regular workers began to take a more active part in resolving production questions, satisfaction with earnings rose and relations in the collective improved (in the opinion of the men). Among the negative changes were the increased fluctuations in earnings from month to month; the male workers also felt that they were more poorly provided than before with materials, raw products and stock.

Up to now we have been examining the trends common to the workers of the state enterprises and the cooperative plant. Now let us focus our attention on the differences between them. Judging from the replies, changes in the workload and earnings occur more often at the cooperative enterprise. Thus, the workload increased for 91 percent of the cooperative members in comparison with 62 and 72 percent of those questioned at the state enterprises, the earnings rose for the former in 62 and 70 percent of the cases and for the latter in 25 and 38 percent. (All the differences, with the exception of one are statistically significant with $p < 0.05$; here and below we compare the subgroups of the same sex.) In addition, changes in the workload and labor remuneration at the cooperative plant occurred, evidently, in a more coordinated manner. This conclusion derives from the replies of the cooperative members who more frequently than the employees of the state enterprises admitted that wages had become more just and that their contribution to production corresponded to earnings. On the other hand, at the state enterprises the workers more frequently than in the cooperative were convinced that "they give to production more than they receive" (among the women, the designated differences are significant with $p < 0.05$).

Other differences also show the as-the-whole better picture for the process of changes at the cooperative plant. Thus, among the cooperative members, a noticeable portion of those questioned pointed out that the social organizations had begun to work better, with greater benefit and that the orders of the management had become more intelligent. If it is considered that the cooperative members speak much more frequently of the increased involvement of ordinary workers in resolving production questions, then it can be concluded that the cooperative management mechanism is ahead of the state-administrative one not only in terms of the increased executor workload of the ordinary workers (this was mentioned above) but also in terms of the development of initiative expressed in the activities of the managers, the leaders of the social organizations and the workers themselves. In addition, the workers at the cooperative plant more rarely than the state enterprise workers complained of a deterioration in working conditions (among the women these differences are significant with $p < 0.05$) and to a lessening of attention by management to the vital needs of the employees. Thus, the more marked growth of the labor return from the workers at the cooperative plant in the course of the economic changes was accompanied, judging from the estimates of the workers, by a more noticeable improvement in their own situation as well as by less noticeable losses.

Obviously, the designated features of the processes occurring in the production cooperatives gradually become known also to the state enterprise workers, strengthening in some a desire for new management conditions (a desire to leave for a cooperative, a desire to convert one's own enterprise into a cooperative or leased

one), while in others intensifying an already-existing rejection of the radically new forms of economic activity.

An analysis of the changes felt by the workers serves as a sort of test as to which of the changes planned on the scale of society in the previous year had reached the individual worker. Judging from the data of our poll, it is possible to speak about noticeable socially desirable shifts in the level of the workload, wages and the incentive function of wages and the development of self-management; these were noted by at least 20 percent of those questioned in each of the isolated subgroups. But for now it is valid to consider only the increased workload and wages (the latter only at the cooperative plant) as sufficiently widespread (noted by more than 50 percent of the respondents).

There are also those measures contained in the economic reform program which, in the opinion of the workers, have not yet been carried out. Unfortunately, among these are the innovation processes; a marked rise in the rate of introducing new equipment and production methods and developing new products are still not felt; these processes, possibly due to their greater labor and resource intensiveness, involve greater inertia.²

Undesirable changes have occurred and new problems have arisen and these, chiefly, are related to the growing diverse shortages which are characteristic for our socio-economic life. In the first place, as the male workers pointed out, there is a growing scarcity in production supply and this is evidently an inevitable payment for the too slow adjustment of the economic mechanism as the levers for the centralized distribution of absolutely everything have somewhat weakened but the new forms of horizontal ties between the enterprises have not yet been established.³ Unsteady supply, in turn, causes increased fluctuations in earnings from month to month and this was pointed out by a noticeable share of workers in all the subgroups. Secondly, the increased earnings noticed by the workers led, as a rule, to stronger inflation and scarcity of consumer goods and services and this partially cancelled out the increased monetary payments. Thirdly, the increased workload noticed by the largest number of persons questioned could not help but exacerbate the shortage of conditions characteristic of our society for the complete restoring of the work efficiency of the personnel. The reticence of the internal production means for saving and restoring work efficiency to compensate for the increased load on the employee precisely caused a noticeable number of judgments by persons questioned concerning the deterioration in working conditions. Equally acute, as is known, is the problem of the external production conditions for maintaining and restoring work efficiency (for the situation in Moscow, see [7]). In order to change the situation, we must in particular decisively abandon the didactic opposition of labor and recreation, production and nonproduction activities, and realize that these are not antagonists but rather mutually necessary elements in the integrated way of life for man. The lag in leisure and recreation sphere as well as the increased load observed

everywhere on the employee and in his nonproduction life at present are becoming substantial factors limiting the increased labor return (particularly for women).

Growing Dissatisfaction

The changes, as we see, are just beginning. In order to judge their further fate and gain an idea as to the prospects for the development of the current situation, it is important to understand the attitude of the workers to the current state of affairs on the job, and ascertain to what degree they are satisfied, or, conversely, dissatisfied. This will determine

the mind set of the workers whether or not to maintain and support the status quo, if this is acceptable, or seek out ways for changes, if the current state of things causes dissatisfaction. The replies of the workers to questions concerning satisfaction with various aspects of work and work as a whole are shown in Table 2. Let us immediately emphasize that the satisfaction of the Moscow workers questioned in 1988 was low. The average assessments for the individual aspects varied in the different subgroups from -1.5 to +0.6 with a scale from -2 to +2 points, while for work as a whole these were somewhat higher running from +0.4 to +1.2 of a point.

**Table 2: Satisfaction With the Job as a Whole and Its Individual Aspects
(Distribution of Replies, % and Average Values)***

Basic satisfaction	Subgroups	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	μ	σ 1 (σ 2)	1-2
Sanitary and hygiene conditions	I	58(24)	22(31)	9(14)	9(13)	1(17)	-1.3(-0.3)	1.0(1.4)	-1.0
	II	58(16)	25(26)	5(12)	2(15)	2(31)	-1.5(+0.2)	0.8(1.5)	-1.7
	III	49	28	7	5	7	-1.1	1.2	-0.8
	IV	53	27	6	6	4	-1.2	1.1	-1.4
Amount of wages	I	29(11)	40(29)	11(14)	16(21)	2(26)	-0.8(+0.2)	1.1(1.6)	-1.0
	II	30(5)	28(20)	16(15)	12(19)	10(40)	-0.6(+0.7)	1.3(1.3)	-1.3
	III	20	33	18	18	11	-0.3	1.3	-0.5
	IV	6	18	28	25	20	+0.4	1.2	-0.3
Course of changes in enterprise	I	30	32	22	12	3	-0.8	1.1	
	II	25	21	25	9	9	-0.5	1.3	
	III	22	20	27	22	9	-0.2	1.3	
	IV	8	14	30	21	18	+0.3	1.2	
Possibility of participating in production management	I	19(12)	20(10)	40(40)	10(11)	6(25)	-0.4(+0.3)	1.1(1.3)	-0.7
	II	10(8)	7(8)	51(46)	7(9)	9(25)	0.0(+0.4)	1.0(1.2)	-0.4
	III	17	15	51	12	2	-0.3	1.0	-0.6
	IV	6	7	51	7	13	+0.2	1.0	-0.2
Possibility of employing one's knowledge, experience and creative abilities	I	15(6)	15(10)	41(28)	14(20)	11(34)	-0.1(+0.7)	1.2(1.2)	-0.8
	II	14(5)	4(6)	51(43)	9(13)	4(30)	-0.2(+0.6)	1.0(1.1)	-0.8
	III	16	24	51	7	2	-0.4	0.9	-1.1
	IV	4	6	62	5	6	0.0	0.8	-0.6
Possibility of improving skills	I	22(11)	27(12)	19(18)	10(14)	20(44)	-0.2(+0.7)	1.4(1.4)	-0.9
	II	12(7)	5(9)	44(33)	9(10)	19(38)	+0.2(+0.6)	1.2(1.3)	-0.4
	III	41	10	28	11	10	-0.6	1.4	-1.3
	IV	10	8	35	16	20	+0.3	1.2	-0.3

**Table 2: Satisfaction With the Job as a Whole and Its Individual Aspects
(Distribution of Replies, % and Average Values)* (Continued)**

Basic satisfaction	Subgroups	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	12)	σ)1 (σ 2)	1-2
Relations with leadership (in 1976, with foremen)	I	4(2)	23(5)	30(8)	31(16)	12(70)	+0.2(+1.5)	1.0 (0.9)	-1.3
	II	9(2)	14(3)	39(7)	14(12)	19(76)	+0.2(+1.6)	1.2(0.9)	-1.4
	III	12	15	27	27	17	+0.2	1.2	-1.3
	IV	8	13	26	14	36	+0.6	1.3	-1.0
Work as a whole**	I	8(3)	18(8)	9(16)	32(32)	21(40)	+0.4(+1.0)	1.3 (1.1)	-0.6
	II	14(3)	16(7)	5(22)	25(25)	40(42)	+0.6(+1.0)	1.5(1.1)	-0.4
	III	7	12	5	30	46	+1.0	1.3	0.0
	IV	1	13	9	15	59	+1.2	1.1	0.2

* In the parentheses are the data for the 1976 research. The share of persons not answering is not given. Key: -2—completely does not satisfy; -1—rather does not satisfy; 0—cannot say whether satisfies or not; +1—more satisfies than not; +2—completely satisfies. [mean]X[in the source, this is an X with a bar on top, indicating mean/average]—average number of points; σ —mean deviation; [mean]X₁-[mean]X₂—amount of difference between average number of points according to research of 1988 and 1976.

** Here the key to the answers is as follows: -2—completely dissatisfied with job; -1—more dissatisfied than satisfied; 0—work indifferent for me; +1—more satisfied than dissatisfied; +2—work completely satisfying. In 1976, the judgment 0 was also given to the reply "I cannot say."

The strongest dissatisfaction was with the sanitary and hygiene conditions on the job with around 80 percent of the workers in each subgroup dissatisfied with them. This was the reaction of the workers to the absence at the industrial enterprises of conditions for maintaining work efficiency of the personnel and restoring this and this was particularly intolerable in a situation of increased workloads. Relations with the leadership were assessed higher than the other aspects, although in the given instance it is possible that the respondent was less sincere than when it was a question of the "impersonal" elements of the production situation. In assessing the course of changes at the enterprise in the three subgroups out of four, negative statements prevail over positive ones. Behind such assessments which, of course, are particularly widespread at the state enterprises lies the dissatisfaction on the part of many workers with the pace of the economic reform and the conviction that it could be faster and more radical. The given conclusion is also confirmed by the content of those demands which were made during the miner strikes in the summer of 1989. As is known, the strikers were demanding the more consistent and immediate implementation of the main ideas of the economic reform.

For the women employed at the cooperative plant, in comparison with the female workers at the state enterprises, all the estimates were higher (all the differences, with the exception of two were statistically significant with $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.001$). As for the men, the cooperative members in statistically significant terms surpass the state enterprise workers in terms of satisfaction with earnings, the course of the changes and work as a whole ($p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.001$). Thus, the given data favor the economic mechanism operating at the cooperative plant and this concurs with the conclusion of the greater dynamicness of this mechanism and

which we reached as a result of analyzing the changes as perceived by the workers. However, the picture would not be complete unless it were said that the men employed at the cooperative plant still do not feel a greater satisfaction from their relations with their immediate superior and the opportunities for self-development are less satisfied than for the men employed at the state enterprises ($p < 0.05$).

In order to more clearly assess the current indicators for satisfaction, it is beneficial to compare them with some standard. This could be the results of the research conducted by a collective of sociologists under the leadership of V.A. Yadov at 12 Leningrad industrial enterprises in 1976 and covering over 4,000 workers including 1,770 women and 2,233 men [8]. In both studies—in 1988 and 1976—they used the same designation for the elements of the production situation and identical variations of replies (these are given in Table 2). In both instances, the information characterizes the employees of state industrial enterprises in a major city, although from the viewpoint of the sectorial and vocational composition the sampling of those questioned in 1988 was less diverse. The assessments of satisfaction with all aspects of the job for our respondents (both at the state enterprises and at the cooperative plant) were lower than the corresponding indicators of the Leningrad study (see Table 2). These differences are statistically significant (in a predominant majority of instances with $p < 0.001$) and in 1/2 of the instances their absolute amount falls within the range of from 0.8 to 1.7 of a point (according to a 5-point scale).

If one compares only the workers of the state enterprises (and they, as is known, presently make up a predominant majority in the total number of the nation's workers), then the share of those dissatisfied with earnings over the 12 years rose from 40 to 69 percent for the men and from 25 to

58 percent (that is, by more than double) for the women, dissatisfaction with sanitary and hygiene conditions, respectively, rose from 55 to 80 percent and from 42 to 83 percent. Among the men there were more of those dissatisfied with the available opportunities to participate in production management while among the women the proportional amount of those satisfied with these opportunities was cut in half. The share of those satisfied with the opportunities for self-realization and improving skills also was reduced by 2-3-fold (all the listed differences are statistically significant with $p < 0.05$). While in 1976, positive statements predominated in the assessments of all the examined elements in the production situation, 12 years later the opposite picture was observed with negative assessments prevailing over positive ones in a predominant majority of the cases.

It is worthy of note that the reduced satisfaction and the increased dissatisfaction sometimes occur against a background of an improvement in the real state of affairs. For example, in 1976, when there was no question of the real involvement of the workers in management, 34-36 percent of the workers questioned expressed satisfaction with the opportunities provided them on this level and at present, when due to the creation of the labor collective councils, the introduction of the procedure of electing leaders and the overall democratization of the sociopolitical atmosphere, such opportunities have actually risen, the corresponding figures have declined by more than 2-fold. In our view, this is explained not by differences in the samplings of the Moscow and Leningrad research but rather by fundamental psychological changes caused by perestroika, that is, the arousing in a significant portion of the workers of a feeling of their own worth, increased demands and a desire to overcome the alienation from production and the world of social relations. Virtually all

estimates of satisfaction disclosed in the course of polls conducted by us at state industrial enterprises in Moscow (May 1988) and Taganrog (April 1989) were also lower than in 1976. This confirms our conclusion that the reduced satisfaction is a consequence of broad social changes brought about by perestroika.

Outside the dependence upon the causes leading to increased dissatisfaction, its function in the current social situation is very important. The increased dissatisfaction of the workers with the current state of affairs and even the course of the changes and the open expression of this dissatisfaction are an incentive coming from the workers and also a guarantee of further changes and a necessary prerequisite for real transformations not only on the job but also in society as a whole. The lack of dissatisfaction or even its remaining on the level and in the forms of the "stagnant" year of 1976 would show that impulses for further changes are lacking from the workers.

Who Can Work Better

The choice of the next steps in the economic reform depends upon those reserves which our economy possesses. There is the widespread opinion that the underutilized labor energy of the workers is among the really existing and comparatively easily mobilized reserves. But recently, as our data indicate (see Table 1), the workload for a majority of the workers has already risen; do reserves remain here for further growth?

In assessing their own labor output and the output of other categories of workers, many of those questioned admitted that they themselves, their comrades in the brigade, the workers of other brigades and shops as well as the managerial personnel at the enterprise do not make a complete effort (Table 3).

Table 3: Judgments by Workers on the Completeness of Labor Output by Different Categories of Employees (Distribution of Answers, % and Average Values)

Self-Assessment and Assessments of Labor Effort	State Enterprises									
	Men					Women				
	1	2	3	X	σ	1	2	3	X	σ
I work	7	63	27	2.2	0.6	4	25	67	2.7	0.5
Workers of our brigade work	14	68	17	2.0	0.6	7	49	46	2.4	0.6
Workers of our enterprise as a whole work	21	68	3	1.8	0.5	18	44	25	2.1	0.7
Managerial personnel of enterprise works	70	27	4	1.3	0.5	47	42	4	1.5	0.6
Cooperative Plant										
I work	2	58	38	2.4	0.5	1	21	74	2.8	0.4
Workers of our brigade work	6	60	33	2.3	0.6	4	29	65	2.6	0.6

Table 3: Judgments by Workers on the Completeness of Labor Output by Different Categories of Employees (Distribution of Answers, % and Average Values) (Continued)

Workers of our enterprise as a whole work	10	63	20	2.1	0.6	8	36	41	2.4	0.6
Managerial personnel of enterprise works	56	40	5	1.5	0.6	42	42	5	1.6	0.6

Key: 1—far from completely; 2—normally, but could be more; 3—complete output. [mean]X[in the source, this is an X with a bar over it, indicating mean/average]—average number of points; σ—mean error.

Let us examine in more detail how those questioned view their own output in labor and the output of other workers. The assessments by men and women differed sharply: in terms of themselves and other workers the men prefer the evaluation "works normally but could be better"; women prefer the assessment "works at full output." (The preferences of the men are statistically significant with $p < 0.05$ in five distributions of the assessments and for women in three; both the men and the women resort rather rarely to the estimate "works far from fully" in terms of workers.) It is actually clear that for a majority of the female workers the reserves for a further rise in labor productivity coming from their own forces are already depleted, while for a majority of the males, regardless of the increased workload last year, such reserves still exist. This difference is expressed not only in the self-evaluations of the men and women but also in their estimates of other workers to whom the respondents most probably project ideas of their own labor expenditures (virtually all the differences between the mean self-evaluations of the men and women as well as between their assessments of other workers are statistically significant with $p < 0.001$).

The difference in the labor output of men and women is explained not only by differences in labor morality. Also of importance are technological factors as among the women there are more of those on whom the machine or conveyor imposes a high work pace. Also important is the nonproduction load and since for women this, as is known, is significantly higher, for the job they have more

meager energy resources which for this reason are more frequently employed without a reserve.

The respondents employed at the cooperative plant evaluated their current own output and the output of other workers higher than those employed at the state enterprises (all, with the exception of one, differences in the averages are statistically significant with $p < 0.5$, $p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.001$). This means that due to the more marked increase in the workload over the last year (see Table 1) that the economically independent cooperative plant, the labor potential of the workers is more fully realized while in a smaller number of them reserves have remained for a further rise in the labor effort. All the same, the differences in the degree of economic independence in the given instance have a lesser influence than the sex differences and for this reason the average assessments are ranked in the following manner (in the direction from the greater reserves to the lesser): male workers from the state enterprises, male workers from the cooperative plant, female workers from the state enterprises and female workers from the cooperative plant.

In developing the question of reserves for labor productivity, we asked the workers how they could do more than at present under the condition that there was no "ceiling" on earnings, a revision of rates and so forth (earnings is the most widespread among the motives for labor among those questioned: from 44 to 54 percent of them felt that "work is a method to earn money"). The replies shown in Table 4 show that reserves for increasing labor productivity actually do exist and provide a concrete description of them.

Table 4: Distribution of Replies to the Question of Possible Methods of Increasing Labor Productivity, %*

Replies	State Enterprises		Cooperative Plant	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
See to it that equipment broke down less and was more rapidly repaired	32	25	14	19
Begin oneself to repair equipment	7	0	11	1
Seek replacement of equipment by better	41	32	27	19
Seek steady supply	38	33	43	37
Make fewer breaks, work more intensely	25	10	17	10
Work overtime	31	19	37	25
Master related professions	27	12	22	9
Find most rational work procedures	33	14	37	17

Table 4: Distribution of Replies to the Question of Possible Methods of Increasing Labor Productivity, %* (Continued)

Replies	State Enterprises		Cooperative Plant	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
I can do no more, I am working at limit of possible	9	30	24	46

* Each respondent could mark several points.

The same conclusion emerges from the replies to the question of what ways for increasing income seem most acceptable to the workers. All variations can be divided into "internal" (seek out additional earnings within one's current enterprise) and "external" (additional work in the cooperative or on the private subsidiary plot, traveling to work overseas, transfer to another state enterprise or to a cooperative and so forth). The largest number of voices chose the "internal" variations for increasing income including: "more intensive labor during working hours" with from 28 to 38 percent in the various subgroups and "overtime at one's own enterprise" from 36 to 49 percent (a majority of the differences in terms of popularity between these and other variations is statistically significant with $p \leq 0.05$).

Let us return to Table 3. As we can see, the average estimates by the respondents for the labor return of the management personnel differed sharply from all the others: they were approximately 1 point (according to a 3-point scale) lower than the average self-estimates of the workers and noticeably lower than the estimates "set" for other workers ($p < 0.001$). Suffice it to say that from 42 to 70 percent of the workers were convinced that the enterprise management personnel works "far from full force" while at the same time in terms of other workers such a viewpoint is expressed by not more than 21 percent of those questioned and, in terms of oneself, by not more than 7 percent (all the differences are statistically significant with $p \leq 0.05$).

Of course, in the given instance we are involved only with opinions and not objective measurements. But regardless of whether or not they are adequate to reality, the notions of a majority of the workers that the managers work less than the managed points to the presence of a serious social conflict characteristic of the current situation at industrial enterprises. Let us examine the mechanism of its occurrence.

The psychological state of our society at present is characterized by intensifying processes of the attribution (ascribing) of responsibility and this is explained primarily by the heightened sense of dissatisfaction among the people with various aspects of life, including, as we have seen, the situation on the job. And this gives rise to the search for factors which cause dissatisfaction, those factors which are responsible for its rise [9].

In social conscience two basic forms of attributing responsibility have formed—focused and diffuse. In accord with this, the people divide all participants in

the social process into those who are guilty and innocent and assign responsibility for the vital circumstances which dissatisfy them on various social forces (for example, the bureaucracy, the mafia, the cooperatives, representatives of certain nationalities and so forth). With the second approach, conversely, it is emphasized that to one degree or another all or virtually all participants in the sociohistorical process are to blame, including those who act as the judges and for this reason the attributing of all responsibility to any limited portion of society is incorrect.

The diffuse approach to attribution of responsibility in our social conscience has not found sufficient distribution.⁴ It is no surprise that for the workers surveyed by us at the industrial enterprises, it was typical to assign the basic guilt for the bad state of affairs on those who possessed greater freedom in decision taking and greater power. This was manifested not only in the negative assessment by the workers in the labor output of the managers but also in the conviction that "the resistance of the bureaucratic apparatus" impedes the eliminating of serious shortcomings in our economy. Precisely this factor from a rather long list was in first place and it was mentioned by from 42 to 59 percent of those questioned in the various subgroups. It is also worthy of note that almost 1/2 of the workers considers the strike an acceptable method for resolving conflicts with the management.⁵

In order to lessen the aggression and recover the lost confidence of the workers in the employees of the management personnel, it is essential not only to significantly increase the real output of the managers (the traditional activity of the functional management services at an industrial enterprise often are actually ineffective and useless; see, for example, [11]), but also sharply democratize management, broaden the involvement of the workers in decision-taking and simultaneously encourage their awareness of their degree of responsibility for the course of events. As long as the "superiors" will authoritatively command the "inferiors" at an enterprise, the "leadership" will be held completely for all the setbacks and problems.

How to Proceed in the Future

Dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs, like a recognition that many could work better, have forced the workers to give some thought as to what further steps are required to improve the situation.

**Table 5: Distribution of Replies to the Question:
"What Must Be Done First So That Your Enterprise Begins to Operate Better?"; %***

Replies	State Enterprises		Cooperative Plant	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Improved supply	36	56	64	60
Give people an opportunity to earn more	55	51	53	54
Introduce new equipment and production methods	48	46	57	31
Reduce management personnel	43	37	37	42
Improve organization of labor	34	39	35	42
Improve style and methods of leadership	12	26	26	20
Strengthen labor discipline	28	9	9	6
Give enterprise real independence	14	4	11	8
Reduce diverting of personnel to outside jobs	10	12	7	7
Reduce superfluous workers	9	10	4	3

* Each respondent could mark several (but not more than three) points.

As is seen from Table 5, the most popular among the workers were programs for improving supply, material incentives, technical renewal, debureaucratization and improving the organization of labor. All of these collected at least 1/3 of the votes in each subgroup and their popularity in a statistically significant manner (with $p < 0.05$) exceeds the popularity of a majority of the other programs given in the table (the workers could mark not more than three points).

The large number of supporters for the proposal "provide an opportunity for the people to earn more" shows that this condition is one of the promising ones from the viewpoint of raising labor productivity.⁶ At the same time, such high popularity for the mentioned program shows, unfortunately, that there has not been a real lifting of the restrictions on the amount of earnings and, hence, on the amount of labor achievements. It is no accident that 60-70 percent of the respondents (among the state enterprise employees, somewhat higher than among the cooperative members) answered affirmatively the question "Do you have the feeling that they will still not pay you more than a stipulated amount?"

Incidentally, the claims by the workers were in fact very meager. The replies to the question "What earnings per month do you consider sufficient for yourself?" varied from 320 rubles (the average amount mentioned by female employees of the state enterprises) to 240 rubles (the average in the replies of the male workers at the cooperative plant). If one calculates even from the clearly inflated official rate for the ruble, then it turns out that the desired 440 rubles is over 2-fold less than the real wages of workers in the United States, Great Britain and West Germany (for the data for these nations see [13]). This means that even if the current desires of our respondents were suddenly met, even then the Soviet Union would remain a nation with a cheap labor force. The broad support among the persons questioned for the proposal to reduce management personnel is a direct consequence of those antimanagement attitudes the wide acceptance of which in the worker milieu was described above. It is worthy of note that the idea of reducing surplus workers was shared by not more than 10 percent in each

subgroup and that this is approximately 30 percent less than the share of those who proposed reducing the number of managers at the enterprise (the differences are statistically significant with $p < 0.05$).

The popularity among the workers of the "supply" program should not evoke any surprise. The proposals to improve supply are directly tied to the complaints by a marked number of workers that the situation in this sphere deteriorated last year. The fact that at the cooperative plant this program was raised much more frequently (among the men) is explained clearly by the higher price for a unit of worker time and because of this interruptions in supply cause greater harm here to the workers. It is no accident that the respondents at the cooperative plant said noticeably more frequently than at the state enterprises that the fluctuations in their earnings depend primarily upon the steady supply of raw products, materials and equipment.

In order to more starkly ascertain the comparative popularity of the different transforming program, we formulated a new question, having asked the respondents to choose this time just one, in their view, "the most important thing now for raising labor productivity at the enterprise." The list of possible variations included one "technical" alternative with the "introduction of new equipment and production methods" and three "motivational" ones with "effective material incentives," "stronger discipline" and "belief, a higher idea and enthusiasm." All three motivational programs were aimed at strengthening the impulses encouraging labor by different methods: some of them are based on the desire of a man to provide well-being for himself and his family ("effective material incentives"), others at the fear of punishments and a desire for order and subordination ("strengthening of discipline") and still others at the need to serve society and to share its ideals and values ("belief, the higher idea, enthusiasm"). The technical program, in contrast to the motivational ones, was designed chiefly with the same motivation to attain a greater production effect by new and more advanced equipment.

**Table 6: Distribution of Replies to the Question:
"What at Present Is the Most Important Thing for Raising Labor Productivity at Your Enterprise?", %***

Replies	State Enterprises		Cooperative Plant	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Introduction of new equipment and production methods	58	65	65	56
Effective material incentives	34	21	36	22
Strengthening of discipline	14	9	12	11
Belief, high idea, enthusiasm	3	7	11	13

* The totals for the columns exceed 100% due to the fact that certain persons questioned, contrary to the instructions, marked several points.

The program of technical renewal as a method for increasing labor productivity surpassed in popularity each of the motivational programs individually (differences are statistically significant with $p < 0.05$) and even when taken together (Table 6). Thus, the workers more often set their hopes on equipment and "iron" (although even in terms of this little has changed for now, see Table 1) than they do on changes which can be achieved by working on man and the motives of his conduct.

The technical variation seems preferable to more than $\frac{1}{2}$ of the workers since in this instance the additional loads in the production process will lie not on themselves, as would be the case in strengthening incentives, but on the machinery and equipment. Even the purchase and installing of the new equipment is the responsibility, as the workers see it, not for themselves but rather for specialists and managers. But as was pointed out above (see Table 3), many respondents (particularly among the men) admit that they still have unused reserves of labor energy. For this reason, a significant number of votes was still given to the motivational programs for raising labor productivity and which are aimed at a further rise in the workload and the labor output of the workers.

The support by the workers for the various motivational programs clearly varies. There were most supporters for the program of material incentives with one out of three men and one out of every five women voting for this. The programs designed for the more traditional administrative-disciplinary measures for our recent history ("strengthening discipline") and ideological methods ("belief, the high idea, enthusiasm") for increasing productivity did not gain such broad support among the workers (among the male workers the respective differences are statistically significant with $p < 0.05$; among the women they are the same in sense but do not reach the significance level equal to 0.05).

Worker preference for programs of material and not ideological incentives for labor productivity repudiates the rather widespread opinion according to which "the people, particularly the Russian people, find it difficult to rally for a struggle for just another coin, and a great goal must be set for him" [14]. The obtained data show that the prospect of improving one's well-being and the well-being of one's family has a noticeably greater chance

for increasing the labor activeness of the workers questioned by us than does the "great goal" in its traditional understanding. Incidentally, is not the happier life of each worker and the members of his family also a great goal?

Footnotes

1. It is worthy of note that among the changes which commenced after the transition to the new management conditions, the workers from the Moscow Oblast enterprises (the lease, the "first" and "second" models of cost accounting) questioned by V.M. Rutgayzer and E.D. Azarkh in October 1988, also most often mentioned increased earnings and a greater workload. The increase in the workload (mainly due to overtime "illegal" Saturdays) had occurred, according to the assumption of V.I. Selyunin in the previous 2 years of 1986 and 1987 [6].

2. The workers surveyed by V.M. Rutgayzer and E.D. Azarkh also said that the situation with equipment remained unchanged after the transition to the new management conditions. The lag in changes in this sphere was noted by them more frequently than in any other elements of the production situation [6].

3. Women did not respond as sensitively as the male workers to interruptions in supply and forced stoppages, since they in such instances evidently more value the opportunity to rest and for the sake of this are ready to make a slight concession in earnings.

4. Among the few defenders of the idea of universal responsibility one could put, for example, D.S. Likhachev and M.Ya. Gefter. In particular, Gefter's position could be briefly expressed by the phrase "Stalin is all of us" [10].

5. In truth, just 8 percent of the workers agreed with the notion "I consider a strike a normal method for resolving conflicts" but another 40 percent allowed that "this is permissible in exceptional instances"; some 32 percent of those questioned considered a strike absolutely unacceptable under our conditions and 17 percent chose the avoiding version "I find it difficult to reply."

6. In relying on empirical data, the authors of the research "Worker-76" [12] wrote that for increasing the labor output of the workers it was essential to eliminate

the "ceilings" the norm-setting "from the achieved level" and other limitations on labor income.

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Models of Disequilibrium and Shortage in Centrally Planned Economics [not translated]

00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to
press 1 Dec 89) pp 20-33

POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, THE INDIVIDUAL

At the Apex of the Management Pyramid

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[Article by Lilya Viktorovna Bozrikova and Lyudmila Dmitriyevna Doktorova, scientific associates at the Leningrad Affiliate of the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; this is the first time they appear in our journal. Pavel Nikolayevich Lebedev is a doctor of legal sciences and sector head at the same institute. Our journal has published his article "On the Question of Constructing a General Theory of Social Planning" (No 4, 1977, co-author)]

[Text] In order to achieve success in the renewal of our society, intense efforts are needed from all its members. But at this crucial stage, each socioprofessional group must play its role and surmount its problems and difficulties. In the various spheres of social life, the "forces of inhibition" manifest themselves differently; the impact of these forces on the overall course of perestroika also varies. Of particular interest is the role of the leading personnel of the state administrative bodies as they hold key positions in ensuring the development of all spheres of our society's life. It would be an error to underestimate their importance in the insipient process of perestroika.

As is known, under the conditions of the dominance of state ownership of the means of production, the role of the managerial bodies in the life of society was extraordinarily great. The course of major and minor affairs in all spheres of social life depended upon how efficiently these bodies operated at the center and on the spot, upon what goals they endeavored to achieve, and whether they rationally disposed of the national wealth of our enormous country.

It is not surprising that activating personnel policy in the management sphere has become an important component in perestroika which has commenced in the nation. The changes in the upper levels of the state hierarchy caused particular interest. At the First Congress of People's Deputies, major complaints were leveled against the central ministries and departments and the essence of these came down briefly to the fact that for long years their activities had not corresponded to the nature and scale of the goals confronting society. A fundamental restructuring of these bodies is an extremely important task and the pace of renewal in our

society as well as the costs of this process will depend largely upon how it is carried out.

In research on the state administrative systems for long years, there was the dominance of the organizational (structural-functional) approach. The human factor in this system was touched upon solely from its formal aspect: in reviewing questions concerning the legal status of the officials in the state apparatus, the procedure for performing official duties, and the nature of legal responsibility. Even an analysis of the specific activities of state officials in essence was restricted to a review of their normative setting. This was totally the area of the competence of legal science but this science was not concerned with the questions of the social appearance of the state apparatus officials, their value orientations, motivation and so forth.

The consequences of this are felt both in theory and in practice. In theory this is the one-sided, very schematic notions for the mechanism of reproducing the state administrative system. We do not have any developed concept of this process, and this gap has gone virtually unnoticed in ignoring its subjective aspect. As for the practice of improving administration, this has come down basically to structural and functional changes (organizational restructurings).

The multitiered and branched system of state administration is always in a certain (normative / set) functional state and for this reason a desire to proceed contrary to the established procedure here involves the risk of losing the effect of the action. Here there is reason to fear that the expected result will either be nullified on a purely functional basis (absorbed in the system) or will be simply blocked as deviating from the normatively set regime of activity.

The state machine cannot be halted for reconstruction or connected to a fundamentally new operating system; it can be adjusted only while in motion, largely at the expense of the efforts of its personnel potential. Precisely it [the potential] should assimilate the new guidelines, elaborate new methods and forms of activity, overcome the established stereotypes of thinking and get free of the norms which hinder initiative both of the subordinate spheres as well as the state bodies themselves.

A desire to see in the functioning of the state administrative institutions the activities of living people, their contradictory interests and a recognition that the effectiveness of these bodies depends not only upon organizational factors but also upon the quality of the personnel itself would mean a fundamental about-face in the understanding of the capabilities and reserves for improving state administration. And this means that an immediate social imperative would arise: to investigate the cadre corps of the state apparatus profoundly and thoroughly, and including here the most highly placed officials, using sociological means.

In the first stage, the study of the leading personnel of the state apparatus can be based on biographic data given in

various publications such as newspapers, encyclopedias and references. Our data bank which has been built up over many years makes it possible to provide a description of the social backgrounds of three groups of leaders: those comprising the USSR government from the 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s (41 persons); those appointed to the First Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Sitting (1984) with 61 persons; those promoted after the 27th CPSU Congress to replace the previous group at the end of its term of power with 84 persons. In terms of their official status these are the chairmen of the state committees, the ministers and leading workers with a rank of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The addition provided here to the group of leaders from the ministries and departments is caused by the availability of data. The information on the first group obtained basically from obituaries cannot be considered representative (around 1/3 of the general aggregate). As for the second and third groups, they are sufficiently representative (although in terms of the third the data are somewhat meager chiefly that which was published in IZVESTIYA in submitting the appointed leaders of the ministries and departments).

In speaking about the membership of the first and second groups, it is essential to point out that actually a portion of the first was also present in the second (persons who were appointed for a new term in 1984). For this reason these two groups could be combined into one. Nevertheless we have decided not to bring together these groups for, in the first place, the size of the second is rather representative and in merging with the first the sampling would be eroded and secondly, precisely this

group appointed in 1984 has undergone a mass renewal in the course of perestroika before the end of its term.

Of great interest is the fact that a predominant majority of the officials comprising the first and second groups achieved a high official position before reaching the age of 40 and a third of them did this by the age of 35 (Table 1), while the leaders of the ministries and departments appointed in the period of perestroika in their majority reached this level only by the age of 45 and only 11 percent did this before the age of 35. Simple calculations indicate that for the first group the period of reaching this level occurred at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s and for the second group this was the end of the 1950s (persons promoted in the "Khrushchev years"). The attaining of high official position by persons promoted by perestroika occurred at the middle of the 1970s and they moved up the official ladder during the years of stagnation. Thus, according to our data, the most significant and sharpest replacement of leadership personnel in the state apparatus during the postwar period occurred in the "Khrushchev years." The current revival of personnel policy at the apex of the managerial pyramid, although involving the leadership of all the ministries and departments, does appear smoother. Here one cannot help but feel the clear inhibition in vertical mobility in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s which to a certain degree was natural due to the previous significant rejuvenation in the state apparatus personnel. Over time the inhibiting of vertical mobility intensified due to the fact that the leaders of the ministries and departments (and consequently, the chiefs of the main administrations and other subdivisions) remained in their positions for 15 and 20 years.

Table 1: Age of Officials at the Moment of Their First Promotion on the Path to Ministerial Posts

Groups	Age Groups, Years						No Information	Average Age, Years
	To 30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55		
First (appointed 1960s-1970s)	7	30	37	16	7	—	2	38
Second (appointed 1984)	13	20	28	26	11	2	—	37.5
Third (new appointments: 1986-1988)	—	11	30	35	20	4	4	42

This conservative trend in the period of stagnation was also confirmed in establishing the average age of the ministers and the state committee chairmen at the moment of their promotion to the position (the appointments of 1984 and the period of perestroika). As is seen from Table 2, the average age of the state committee leaders and ministers appointed in the 1980s was 56.5 years, while those promoted in the period of perestroika (the third group) was

even a little higher. Among the latter, there are absolutely no leaders younger than 45 and very few (13 percent) under 50, while in the first group there were respectively 33 and 61 percent of these age groups. We feel that this partially explains the inertia in the activities of the ministries and departments until very recently and this has been described in the press as one of the strongest acting factors in inhibiting perestroika.

Table 2: Age of Ministers and Chairmen of State Committees at Moment of Appointment to Position, %

Groups	Age Groups, Years								Average Age, Years
	To 40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66-70	71 and Older	
First	12	21	28	18	10	8	2	—	49
Second	—	2	20	23	31	13	11	—	56.5
Third	—	—	13	25	43	13	1	4	56.6

Let us now turn to other important characteristics for the leaders of the central state bodies including level of education and specialty. All the leaders of the mentioned categories certainly have VUZ diplomas. Among the persons appointed to governmental posts during the years of perestroika, there are many holders of academic degrees and titles and there are even academy members.

However, of greatest interest for us is not the education level (there is nothing surprising in the fact that it is very high), but rather its profile or specialty. As is seen from Table 3, a majority of the ministry and department leaders has engineer and technical educations and if to this group we add persons with a close (agricultural) education, then the majority becomes predominant.

Table 3: Character of Education for Leaders of Ministries and Departments, %

Groups	Engineer-Technical	Agricultural	Humanities (Including Medical)	Party-Political	Military	No Data
First	50	5	27	3	7	8
Second	66	7	15	3	2	7
Third	63	10	17	3	2	5

The predominant representation of persons with a technical education and, correspondingly, the few members of the humanities among the government-level leaders is a significant factor determining the technocratic orientation of the state administrative system as a whole. According to the admission of many specialists, beginning with the second half of the 20th Century, due to the growing complexity of managerial problems, such orientation has become prevailing in all industrially developed countries and has given rise to the almost uncontrollable power of the technocrate in both internal firm management as well as in the state sector. In our nation this trend has also made itself felt and, in addition, is gradually growing stronger, because national economic management has assumed a narrow sectorial nature and has ended up being divided by departmental partitions.

Under the conditions of sectorial management, the technical specialists, with all the narrowness of professional interests, gain an affirmation of their vision of the world. Hence, their frequent negative attitude toward interests of a social, ecological and cultural sort as well as to their own sort of lamentable complications. This rebuke could be clearly addressed to the entire administrative corps, as a whole, however the involvement of the ministry and departmental leaders in this cannot be doubted. Precisely they represent and, it must be assumed, defend this position in taking large-scale state decisions, and they shape the priority scale which determines the direction for the use of resources primarily in the industrial sectors, in dooming the sociocultural sphere to "residual" financing.

But no matter how strongly the basic education is felt on the adherence to certain value orientations, these, naturally, over time can change substantially under the influence of

the experience of life. For this reason, it is very important to know the type of occupations and the nature of the official duties which determine the specific activities of the ministry and departmental leaders directly prior to their appointment to these high positions. Recently, before a new appointment they ascertain and take into account those professional and personal qualities which are considered essential and sufficient for appointment to high positions.

According to our (Table 4), the positions of ministry and departmental leaders are most often filled by persons from the state apparatus (deputy ministers, the ministers of Union republics and so forth). Particularly high was the share of ministers recruited directly from the state apparatus in the 1984 appointments. It is noteworthy that among the ministers promoted during the years of perestroika, their share has declined sharply from 81 to 54 percent. This has occurred at the expense of increasing the influx of ministers appointed from among the leading party workers as well as from the directors of major scientific-production and production associations. Among the leaders of the central ministries and departments appointed during the period of perestroika, the former are 29 percent and the latter 13 percent. One is struck by the extremely rare promotion of persons having experience in the soviet bodies to posts of ministers and state committee chairmen. Although seemingly, the experience of leading work on the executive committees of the oblast (krai) and city soviets should be of certain value for the governmental level, since this develops the skills of coordinating the sectorial and territorial interests. The neglect of this experience in cadre policy is still another proof of the dominance of the sectorial principle in the state administrative system.

Table 4: Type of Occupations and Positions Held Directly Before Appointment to Posts of Ministry and Departmental Leaders, %

Type of Employment and Position	First Group	Second Group	Third Group
Secretaries of CPSU Central Committee and central committees of Union republic communist parties, oblast (kray) party committees	11	10	19
Heads of departments of CPSU Central Committee and their deputies	5	2	10
Total	16	12	29
USSR ministers and deputy chairmen of USSR Council of Ministers	3	11	12
Chairmen of USSR state committees and their deputies	7	13	6
Chiefs of main administrations under USSR Council of Ministers	20	16	7
Deputy ministers of USSR, ministers of Union republics and their deputies	37	41	29
Total	67	81	54
Leadership of major associations and scientific research institutes	4	2	13
Leading workers in system of local soviets and Supreme Soviets of autonomous republics	2	3	—
Leaders of diplomatic services	—	2	3

In order to understand the importance of the previous place of the work done by the leaders of the state governmental-level bodies, it is essential to trace their previous movements up the official ladder and endeavor to ascertain the characteristic traits of administrative

promotion (of the career type). Although information on service promotion in the party and state bodies is meager, an analysis of the available data makes it possible to disclose three types of career leading to the upper level of the state hierarchy (Table 5).

Table 5: Distribution of Ministry and Departmental Leaders by Types of Career, %

Type of Career	First Group	Second Group	Third Group
Line (sectorial)			
National economic-state	71	61	46
Mixed			
National economic-party-state	11	28	22
National economic-party-soviet-state	11	6	15
Total	22	34	37
Social			
Komsomol-party-state	5	3	9
Komsomol-national economic (party) state	2	—	4
Komsomol-party-soviet-state	—	2	4
Total	7	5	17

Among the first type (the most numerous group for all the three groups), one can put the career of those who remained in the sphere of the national economy for the entire period of their leading work, in following the path from a production leader at an enterprise to the sector leader and minister. A characteristic example of such a career would be: shop chief—enterprise chief engineer—enterprise director—chief of main administration—deputy minister—minister. For the second type of advancement it is characteristic that the career also begins in the national economic sphere but later follows

the transfer (or election) of the worker to party or soviet leading work, and after advancement in these bodies comes a return to the state bodies either in the position of deputy minister or immediately in the post of minister. A typical path: middle-level leader at a production enterprise—instructor for a sectorial department of a party obkom—head of obkom department—deputy minister—minister. For the third type, the start of the career was in the social area, most often in leading Komsomol work and then followed a transfer to the party bodies and from here a move into leading national

economic or soviet work and after corresponding job growth, appointment to the position of leader of a ministry or department.

Characteristically, the most probable path of achieving a ministerial seat is promotion within a single sector (the first type of career), while the second and third paths (providing, in our view, more diversified everyday and administrative experience) are typical for promotion to posts of state committee leaders.

The designated types of career in a very general manner reflect the diversity of routes of advance up the official ladder leading to the apex of the managerial pyramid. At present, the attempts to concretize these types of career are substantially limited by the incompleteness of the empirical data. However, they make it possible to show the prevailing type of activity preceding appointment to ministerial positions. If the maximum duration (at least 25 years) of the length of employment is taken as the indicator for such activities, then among the appointments of 1984 (the second group of leaders) 53 percent of the ministers and the state committee chairmen came from the state apparatus itself. Only 15 percent of them in their previous activities had been engaged basically in party work, and only 8 percent were in leading work at major enterprises and organizations. For the appointments of the perestroika period, characteristic is a noticeable increase in the number of persons with a prevailing stay in managerial activities at large enterprises and organizations (40 percent of the new appointments) as well as with experience in leading party work (respectively, 33 percent). Naturally, there was a significant decline (to 14 percent) in promotions to governmental posts for persons with prevailing experience in the state apparatus.

These considerations could be somewhat deepened by drawing on data showing the vertical mobility in the upper levels of the hierarchy within the ministries and departments themselves. According to our data, for the first and second groups of leaders, appointment to a ministerial post directly was improbable. This was more often achieved after an extended (7-9 years) stay in a post of deputy minister (state committee chairman) or main administration chief. This was particularly characteristic of the 1984 appointments. For a predominant majority of them, the launching pad in the ministerial walls was the post of chief of an administration or, at best, deputy minister (state committee chairman). Characteristic for the new appointments is a very frequent promoting of workers directly to the post of minister or state committee chairman.

An analysis of the types of career and the length of stay in their posts as leading officials of the Union ministries and departments provides reason to feel that the personnel policy of the 1980s at the apex of the state

hierarchy was determined by the well-established mechanism of the functioning of the state apparatus. This is justifiable for the conditions of the normal development of society whereby the nature of the state tasks and the methods of carrying them out determine the process of the forming of the state-level leaders and their typical traits. But in a period of radical perestroika, personnel policy should change in accord with the requirements of renewal and become an important factor in the transformations. With the maintaining of the traditional mechanism, as was correctly pointed out by Yu.A. Levada, the apparatus is entrusted with two contradictory functions: "through it and with its aid at least the primary tasks of social reconstruction are to be implemented, including the tasks of disassembling the obsolete structures; at the same time, there are the directly voiced hopes that through this same apparatus social reconstruction will be checked and held up as much as possible. The first of these functions is based on the efficiency of the apparatus, albeit incomplete and in part sham, when faced with superior power. The second rests on the inertia of the apparatus for which the dominating trait has been and remains self-preservation" [1].

It must be assumed that for carrying out the first function, many ministers and state committee chairmen were recruited during the perestroika period not from the state apparatus but from outside. Understandably many of them have not been able to bring about a noticeable change in the activities of the ministries. It is natural to assume that this has been a consequence of the inertia in the state apparatus as a whole. In order to gain a clear understanding of this, it is essential to know not only the upper stratum of the ministerial personnel. It is essential to initiate profound sociological investigations of all categories of employees—officials and specialists—in the central and republic ministries and departments. At present, one of the weak points in the scientific platform of restructuring the state apparatus is the ignorance of the real potential of the state apparatus personnel and their abilities to handle the new tasks and the attitude caused by this toward perestroika. In order to make up for what has been lost, it is essential to immediately begin a frontal study of the regular personnel of the state apparatus as well as the deputy corps.

The social importance of studying the role of the human factor in the state administrative system is indisputable. This is dictated by the interests of developing glasnost and openness in the entire state mechanism and personnel policy and is one of the essential conditions for democratizing state life.

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Voter Typology

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to
press 1 Dec 89) pp 42-47

[Article by Vladimir Savelyevich Komarovskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences, and department head of the Scientific Research Institute for Experience Under the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] One can understand the interest shown by various sociological centers in the nation in the elections and in the Congress of People's Deputies. Without exaggeration it can be said that a definite resource has been created for establishing a new area for us in sociological studies. On the agenda are the next steps related, in particular, to an attempt to understand the motives and mechanisms for the decisions taken concerning involvement in the elections and to bring out and describe the types of voters. This is in no way required in order to manipulate the behavior of the voters; it is important to help them better understand the complexities of the election campaign and make their choice in a more aware and effective manner. A comparison of the assessments of the voters and the deputy corps before and after the congress, as carried out by us in two regions of the nation from a standard sampling (over 1,200 persons were questioned), indicates that these changed substantially.

If the elections were conducted now, the deputy corps would be largely different. This, in our view, shows that far from all the voters were able to correctly assess the candidate and draw a conclusion which corresponded most to their notions concerning the purpose of the superior governing body.

In addition to the applied goal, the elaboration of the posed questions is also important for the development of sociological science, or more precisely that branch of it which directly studies elections and voter behavior. Since domestic sociology has virtually not studied the election campaigns while Western sociology, on the contrary, pays enormous attention to them and possesses an elaborated instrumentarium, procedures and methods of analysis, it would be natural to turn to the appropriate studies by Western sociologists. However, our situation in elections is very different than in the West (no opposition parties and so forth), and for this reason it is advisable for the meanwhile to leave the tested solutions inside the parentheses and seek out independent approaches.

Marxist methodology proceeds from the view that motives, intentions, subjective aspirations and so forth must be judged on the basis of an analysis of conduct. Here we can clearly trace typological voter groups: 1) the group of those not participating in the election; 2) the group of those who voted against all candidates on the voter lists; 3) the group of those who voted for one (or several) candidates.

The numerical size of the first group is known. It is very small and, according to our data, will not increase over the next elections. Over $\frac{1}{4}$ of those questioned was convinced that voter activeness in the forthcoming elections will grow; less than $\frac{1}{4}$ said it would decline while the remainder stated that it would remain the same or it was difficult to answer the question. Nevertheless, this group, particularly over the long run, requires close attention.

Unfortunately, it is still difficult to judge more certainly about the group of persons who do not participate in the voting. Over $\frac{1}{2}$ could not (or did not want) to answer the questions of the questionnaire either because of excessive age or because they were not interested in the elections; a portion of the respondents did not want to explain the reasons for their conduct. Nevertheless, in several regions, definite information was obtained on the group of those who did not participate in the voting.

The elderly persons, basically, did not vote for reasons of an external character ("it was hard to get back from my daughter's," "from the summer house," "I did not feel well" and so forth); the young people more often did not vote for reasons of indifference or something was not to their liking in the organization of the local elections. A certain portion did not participate in the elections for reasons of a random nature ("the voting precincts closed early," "I could not get there" and so forth).

Naturally, of greatest interest is the second subgroup, or those who did not participate in the voting out of ideological considerations. In the future, basic attention must be paid to this group.

The group of those voting against all candidates was rather extensively represented in our research, and not only for the sample as a whole but also on a level of individual regions (at times it was over 10 percent of those questioned), and this makes it possible to provide a viable analysis of the conduct of this group in the elections.

In the first place, the given group behaved consistently and definitely. Only less than 10 percent of the persons in this group in the course of the electoral campaign changed its initial decision on the voting. Secondly, in this group there is a very hard core which took a final decision even before the official opening of the electoral campaign or immediately after learning who would run in their district and became acquainted with the biographies of the candidates (in the aggregate over $\frac{1}{3}$).

Because of this, the course of the campaign and the means of effect employed (meetings, posters, speeches by the candidate or information on him in the press and so forth, and so forth) had a noticeably smaller impact on this group than on the sample aggregate as a whole.

According to certain indirect data, the group of those voting against everyone is very critically inclined toward the candidates from the party committees. In particular, in the opinion of over 60 percent of this group, in the

elections to the local soviets, the results for the representatives of the party committees were worse than in the elections of the USSR people's deputies (and almost 60 percent had confidence in this unconditionally). In this group there were none certain of a major success for the representatives of the party committees.

In the third group of those who voted for one or several candidates, it is advisable to isolate a special subgroup of those who decided how they would vote directly at the voter precinct on the day of the voting, as well as those who had difficulty answering the question of when and how their decision to vote arose. In this subgroup it is virtually impossible to isolate the leading motives for voting. The nature of their replies to an absolute majority of the questions shows a significant scattering of estimates (opinions); much more frequently than the others, they found it difficult to answer the questions of the questionnaire (in a number of instances up to 80 percent). This subgroup (its share in the sample aggregate is a little more than 20 percent) is marked by an instability of behavior and a poor orientation in the questions of the election campaign. The characteristic statements of this group include: "I changed my intention about voting" with on the order of 15 percent; "did not change" with 7 percent; "I partially changed, I partially did not" with 10 percent; "I did not give any attention to this" with 45 percent. In this group there is a significantly larger number of persons than as an average for the sampling who by election day did not know the last name and the biography of the candidates for whom they were going to vote and their program. They also took little part in the process of proposing and discussing candidates. Virtually none of the members in this group was present at meetings with the candidate or his representative. As a whole, this is a completely definite group of passively indifferent voters and this group possesses vivid specific traits.

The remaining portion of the third group (approximately 1/2 of all the voters) is made up of a comparatively active majority with rather clearly motivated conduct in the elections. Due to its large size, as well as evidently to a number of other factors which as yet are unknown, the group is not seen as a clear compact whole. It is clearly visible in terms of certain parameters (an absolute majority of the persons in this group participated, for example, in one or another form in the putting up and discussing of the candidate deputies, it is sufficiently well acquainted with the Election Law and knew the deputy programs), but for others its inner heterogeneity can be seen. An exception in this subgroup is the small group of persons comprising the enthusiasts (they numbered approximately 6 percent as a whole for the sampling, but in individual regions this figure more than doubled) and they personally, upon their own initiative, participated in agitation for (or against) the candidate, and spoke at meetings, wrote articles, spoke on the radio and so forth. More frequently than others the intelligentsia and CPSU members were among the enthusiasts. In Lithuania the largest number of enthusiasts is found among the peasants.

Certainly the proposed approach does not claim universality and does not free one from a search for other strategies which, in particular, would make it possible in a more differentiated manner to represent the subgroup of the active majority. In addition, it is important not merely to fix the particular features in the conduct of one or another voter group but also ascertain what factors brought this about and for this reason it is very important to analyze the very fact of taking the decision to vote. The voter categories discovered here only partially coincide with the above-described groups.

On the basis of data for one of the regions, facts were brought out on decision-taking for voting: the decision matured after the voter learned who would be the candidate (candidates) in the district and became acquainted with the biography (20 percent); after becoming familiar with the deputy programs (22 percent); after becoming acquainted with materials on the candidate in the press, radio and TV reports (15 percent); after meeting with the candidate (10.4 percent); after becoming acquainted with agitation leaflets and posters (70 percent); the decision was taken directly at the election precinct (a little more than 20 percent).

It is perfectly understandable that the make-up of the voter category groups by regions will differ (depending upon the activeness and the ability of the candidates to win the hearts and minds of the voters, the nature of their programs and so forth). But from the methodological viewpoint, more important is the very fact of their representation. At the same time, it must not be expected that the research results will differ greatly in the other regions. The priorities most probably will be maintained, as they reflect not only the particular features of the election campaign in one or another region, but also the state of mass conscience which is primarily oriented at a rational analysis of the candidate program. Here many voters (almost 60 percent) saw the imperfection of these programs and the presence of unrealistic promises and demagogic statements in them. Thus, there is reason to assert that the given data comparatively actively characterized the effectiveness of all those means employed in the election campaign.

The category of voters who took a decision prior to the opening of the election campaign comprise more than 1/2 of those who voted against everyone or did not vote at all.

The position of this voter category was shaped under the impact primarily of the immediate social milieu (family, acquaintances, comrades at work) and not by the mass information media, meetings with the candidate and so forth. Thus, it is not only marked by a rigidity of conduct in the election campaign but also to a definite degree is actually closed to outside influence. The given category differs sharply from all the others including those who took a decision in other stages of the election campaign and under the influence of other factors.

In the group there is approximately 1.5-fold more than in the sample average of males, persons with a higher education and those who are from 25 to 40 years of age. In principle, this is the best prepared, most flourishing portion of the voters and its conduct cannot be called specific. In addition, this is the sole group the activeness of which will be lower in following elections.

There are two categories in addition to the one named which are characterized by great stability of choice: those who decided to vote after becoming acquainted with the biography of the candidate and after becoming familiar with the program. Here as well no less than 80 percent of the group members did not change their initial decision to vote. The voters who took the decision on their voting immediately after learning who the candidate was in the district and after becoming acquainted with his biography behaved uniformly in the elections: for one portion (around 40 percent of the group) this was sufficient to vote against all the candidates or not to vote at all and for another to prefer a certain candidate.

This circumstance impedes an analysis of the conduct of the given voter category as a single whole. It is united only on the level of the rigidity of its plans to vote. This rigidity can express a previously formed preference and orientation and, simultaneously, the ability to orient oneself independently in the situation with the minimum necessary information (in the group there is a rather high percentage of persons having a higher education).

The given category is more open to outside influence. Almost 1/4 of this group noted the impact of the mass information media on its decision; another nearly 10 percent pointed to the direct presence at a meeting with the candidate or his agent. In the group there are noticeably more men than women and somewhat more than in the sample average of persons 41-50 and 51-55 years of age and persons with a secondary education.

The category of voters which took their decision after becoming acquainted with the candidate programs in many regards is similar to the group of active voters. Here the percentage of persons who did not participate in the elections or who crossed out all candidates is 1.5-2-fold less than the sample average. They were actively interested in the course of the election campaign, they kept up on things and the group was open to the impact of the means employed in running the election campaign. As for the rest, it is a sort of standard for the sample aggregate and its responses, views and composition are the closest to the average.

To a greater or lesser degree this can also be said of those voters who took their decision to vote after becoming acquainted with the materials concerning the candidates in the mass information media, leaflets and posters or directly after meeting with the candidate. Substantial differences between them were observed, as a rule, only for individual parameters. For example, the group which took the decision on the nature of its voting under the

influence of a direct meeting with the candidate differed sharply from all the others in the fact that 1/2 of it after this changed its initial intention about voting.

The proposed basis for voter classification demonstrates well the effectiveness of those means which were employed in the course of the election campaign. Clearly our voter is guided primarily by the candidate's program and this can only be welcomed for undoubtedly this is a rational orientation.

The mass information media had a significant (although less than expected) impact on the course and results of the election campaign. They helped the voter understand the candidate's program and become familiar with him as an individual. The substantial impact on the course of the election campaign of the personal meetings, leaflets and posters which were frequently made by hand shows that its course and results now (and particularly in the future) cannot be programmed "from above."

At present, it is recognized almost universally that elections for us have become an arena of acute political struggle. Actually, the classification (typology) of the voters should have the political sympathies and orientation of the voters as at least one of the bases. It will take time to find such guidelines which are the clearest and provide reliable empirical interpretation. As the first step, one might propose the voters' intentions in voting to be guided by the formal status of the candidate: is he a representative of the party and soviet bodies, a worker (peasant), a leader of the informal associations, a representative of the intelligentsia or an independent candidate acting on his own behalf.

Those who in the coming elections will follow the representatives of the local party and soviet bodies comprise one group (group 1); those who are ready to prefer the intelligentsia, independent candidates and the leaders of informal organizations can be lumped in another, largely different from the first (group 2); those who are oriented at the workers and peasants make up a third, in essence, intermediate group between the two above-named ones (group 3). Those who find it difficult to answer the question (about 12 percent) side with the second group and those who do not consider the status of the deputy as important (6 percent) are in the third. The difference in their political sympathies can be clearly traced in the character of the assessments of the work done by the Congress of People's Deputies.

Thus, in the first group there are only 5 percent of the persons who consider that the previous excessive staging by the apparatus prevailed in the work of the Congress; in group 3 the figure was already 32 percent (with 18.4 percent of persons finding it difficult to reply); in group 2, by categories it was: 36.2 percent oriented to the representatives of the creative intelligentsia; 39.7 percent of members of informal organizations and 40.5 percent for independent candidates (36.7 percent among those who consider deputy social status as important in voting). Those considering that they were able to elect

the most worthy to the USSR Supreme Soviet were: 51.4 percent unconditionally in group 1 and another 22.9 percent partially; in group 3 the figures were 31.1 percent unconditionally and 35 percent partially; in group 2, 15 percent unconditionally and 30 percent partially. Supporting the criticism against many deputies from Moscow in the first group were 42.8 percent and another 34.3 percent partially; in group 3, 22.5 percent supported this and 27.5 percent partially; in group 2, approximately 10 percent support it and 15 percent partially. The congress fully justified expectations of 44.7 percent in group 1; 20.6 percent in group 3 and around 10 percent in group 2.

Very marked were the different replies to such a very important question as "Did the Congress provide a new impetus for perestroika?" In group 1, the unconditional optimists numbered 51.4 percent, in group 3 it was 22.1 percent and in group 2, approximately 10 percent.

It would be natural to ask whether the proposed typology does not conceal the traditionally analyzed differences in the sociodemographic composition of the voters? In actuality, these differences do play a definite role. For example, it became clear that the course and results of the work of the Congress most satisfied persons in the senior age groups with a relatively low level of education. Least satisfied was the intelligentsia, persons with a higher education at an age of 41-55 years. Among the youth there were more who were indifferent to the work of the Congress. But as a whole, the sociodemographic characteristics of the voters more often are not indicative both for the assessments of previous questions and the Congress as well as for forecasting behavior in the coming elections. Thus, to one of the central questions "To what degree did the Congress justify voter hopes?" the workers replied in the following manner: 3 percent were fully satisfied and 17 percent basically satisfied; 30 percent were partially satisfied; 19 percent were basically unsatisfied; 22 percent were not satisfied; 3 percent found it difficult to answer; 4 percent did not put any special hopes on the Congress. Among the workers in the elections to the local soviets, the voters even now are ready to make their choice: 11.5 percent for the leaders of the local party and soviet bodies; 39.3 percent for workers and peasants; 3.3 percent for the leaders of informal associations; 19.7 percent for the representatives of the creative intelligentsia; 13 percent for independent candidates.

As can be seen from the given data, among the workers one can isolate four representative voter groups of a very different orientation, although not equal from the viewpoint of numbers. This poses the difficult task for the researchers to seek out the criteria for the classification and typologization of the voters, for determining their political sympathies and forecasting their conduct in the elections. COPYRIGHT: Otdeleniye filosofii i prava AN SSSR, 1990

EMPLOYMENT, PERSONNEL TURNOVER, ORGANIZATION OF LABOR

Desk Games of Bureaucrats [not translated]

00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to
press 1 Dec 90) pp 48-53

Multishift Working Conditions: Social Consequences [not translated]

00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to
press 1 Dec 89) pp 53-58

APPLIED RESEARCH

Satisfaction With the Job Under Extreme Conditions [not translated]

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to
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Social Status of the Teacher [not translated]

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to
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THE FACTORY SOCIOLOGIST

Should Leaders Be Elected? [not translated]

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to
press 1 Dec 89) pp 71-74

Assessing Effectiveness of Social Measures [not translated]

00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to
press 1 Dec 89) pp 75-77

FACTS, COMMENTARIES, NOTES (FROM THE SOCIOLOGIST'S DESK)

Attitude of Youth Toward Social Science Course

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[Article by Yuriy Aleksandrovich Kovalev, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior science associate at the Department of Philosophy and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] At the current stage of perestroika, we feel, there is no doubt as to the need for a fundamental rise in the

effectiveness of a true introduction of a socialist ideology in the consciousness of the people and particularly the youth, and hence we cannot help but raise the question of studying the very mechanism of assimilating an effective ideological impact by mass consciousness. This work is being carried out in an interdisciplinary scientific research collective (MNIK) organized in mid-1988 under the Department of Philosophy and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The main premise for the work of the collective is the principle according to which the content of the personal experience of people and the provisions of ideology reflect the same "object" or conditions of daily life. "Being a reflection of the immediate conditions of the existence of a class," writes, for example, B.A. Grushin, "class awareness arises primarily on the level of spontaneous, nonprofessional consciousness, thereby acquiring a consistent and clear expression in the class ideology as a more or less ordered system elaborated by thinkers of theoretically formulated provisions" [1]. Thus, the assimilation of an ideology is the interaction between the content of the intrinsic or personal arising on the basis of the unsystematized reflection of the conditions of life and the experience of people and the results of the perception by them of the ideological impact from the "subject" (the theoretical, systematized reflection and analysis of the same conditions).

Let us assume that there is a certain age cohort of 17-year-olds studying in the 10th grade of a secondary school. In the social science lessons in this grade, they become acquainted with the theoretical provisions of Marxism and socialist ideology generally in a systematized form. At precisely this moment the "subject" (the teacher) introduces the theoretical provisions of Marxism into the awareness of the students in the aim of teaching them independently to apply these provisions for an analysis of social processes. All previous cases of acquainting these students with the theory of Marxism did not pursue such a goal and for this reason prior to the start of studying the social science course in the 10th grade—let us take this as an assumption—the schoolchildren were unacquainted with Marxism in a systematized form and with an understanding of its inner logic. On the other hand, by the age of 17 the students have already developed their own judgments on the essence of the "subject of study" with which the system of ideology deals, that is, on the processes in socialist and capitalist societies. What has been said means that precisely in the social science lessons in the 10th grade in the life of the examined group for the first time an interaction is realized between the results of perceiving the material of the social science course and the content of the intrinsic experience of its representatives. This process will bear fruit (that is, the provisions of the ideology will become the content of the convictions of the cohort representatives) only in the instance that the students view the material of the lessons as basically corresponding to their experience.

What has been said here, at first glance, is valid only for an unscientific ideology and is completely unacceptable in the instance when it is a matter of introducing a socialist ideological system into the consciousness of

people. In actuality, in the social sciences lessons the principles of Marxism, the provisions of historical materialism, scientific communism and political economy should be assimilated and these in and of themselves are true knowledge concerning social processes. Consequently, it can be expected that the results of assimilating the social sciences course in the eyes of the students will adequately explain the processes in our nation and in the world as a whole. In addition, even on the ordinary level the result of reflecting real social processes in the conscience of the students (in any event, for practical needs) ultimately should also be adequate to these very processes for, otherwise, it is incomprehensible how mankind up to now has not perished and has not lost the ability to understand social reality.

In other words, it would seemingly be simply impossible for the students to develop a negative assessment of the material of the social science lessons however actually such a view nevertheless arises rather often.

The problem is that the process of the assimilation of the social science course by the students and the shaping of their experience on an ordinary level occur in a very contradictory and varied manner. The actual experience of teaching social sciences in the secondary school indicates that very often (according to our results, in 49 percent of the cases¹ and this coincides with other assessments), the teachers are satisfied if the students can confidently reproduce the mechanically learned provisions of the theory, without going into its inner logic and as a minimum a grade of 4 is given for such "assimilation" of the material. As a result of the spread of such practices in the mind of a significant portion of the students, a so-called ideological stereotype has been formed, that is, a rote-learned set of categories and principles of historical materialism, scientific communism and political economy. In the given instance in the mind of the schoolchildren, in putting it figuratively, only a "essential grid" of the historical process is formed. And this "grid," without having become for the student a tool of independent analysis for social processes, is mechanically superimposed on the content of experience. The arising ideological stereotype becomes for the student, so to speak, an absolute substitute for a true theory of scientific communism and socialist ideology generally and in all instances when it is required to assess the theory of scientific socialism and socialist ideology, the student assesses only the ideological stereotype which has formed in his mind.

From Marxist dialectics it is known that the essence or the regular pattern determines the direction of processes in a concrete society only ultimately, through the mass of deviations from this essential or regular pattern. It is also known that the essential or determining thing can be discovered in processes occurring in the daily life of a concrete capitalist or socialist nation only with a special analysis of these processes taken over significantly long historical segments. In one or another moment it is completely possible to have a situation whereby (if one views things from the position of ordinary awareness)

one is struck precisely by those facts and phenomena which objectively correspond to the "mass of deviations" for the essential and determining factor for socialism or capitalism. However, the student in whose mind an ideological stereotype has formed is absolutely incapable of analyzing independently the general, particular and individual in this very complex dialectic in terms of what he saw or learned about the life in his own nation and in the West. And in this context the interaction of the provisions of Marxism assimilated by the student in the form of an ideological stereotype and the content of his previously formed experience is carried out, if it can be so said, outside the dialectic of the natural and the concrete. Certainly the result of such an interaction is foregone.

The reader may wonder whether there really is such a large share of those in the experience of whom a marked role is played by information corresponding to the "massive deviations" from the essential or determining factor for socialism or capitalism?

Our poll has shown that this share is very large. Thus, 61 percent of those questioned know that the population in the capitalist countries has an opportunity to gain objective information about the negative aspects in the life of their countries; 77 percent know that any person in a capitalist nation has the right to resort to the courts for illegal actions by officials; 50 percent know that on the television of a number of leading Western European nations there are regular discussions involving representatives from the communist parties of these countries; 68 percent is informed that in the United States today the world's highest labor productivity has been achieved in industry, while West Germany and Japan are quite close to this level; finally, 79 percent of those questioned know that in the United States in 1988, public opinion polls were regularly conducted on the popularity of M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan among the Americans, and the results of these polls in any instances were widely published.

Today's youth is widely informed also on the difficulties which our nation has encountered. For example, in the course of the research it was established that 94 percent of those questioned know that at the end of the 1970s, the nation was in a precrisis situation; 71 percent knew that the production and sale of alcoholic beverages was being rapidly increased to cover the expenditure portion of our budget; 72 percent were informed that we have one of the lowest levels (for developed countries) of lawyers per capita; 75 percent know that in many instances cooperatives have been more flexible in considering public demand than the state enterprises.

The given results of the poll provide grounds to formulate two main hypotheses: 1) among the students in whose mind an ideological stereotype has formed and who are well informed on the contradictory processes under socialism and under the conditions of capitalism, a positive evaluation of the results of assimilating the material in the social science lessons is less widespread

than among students in whose minds an ideological stereotype did not arise (that is, they to a definite degree had mastered the skills of independent analysis of social processes) and who also are well informed; 2) among students in whose mind an ideological stereotype has formed but who are relatively poorly informed on the contradictory processes in socialist and capitalist societies, a positive view of the material in the social science course is more widespread than among students with an established ideological stereotype but well informed.

The procedure for verifying both hypotheses envisaged an empirical interpretation of the concept "student with a formed ideological stereotype," for in the poll and analysis it was essential to isolate those who in the course of the social science lessons learned the basic theoretical provisions of Marxism merely mechanically. For this an attempt was made, to put it figuratively, of the "operationalization of the situation," and a list of conditions was drawn up leading to the rise of a stereotype. Thus, it was assumed that if: 1) the student had no interest in the social science course; 2) he constantly felt that he was desperately short of time to prepare for the next school day; 3) the social science teacher for various reasons was satisfied if the students answered with unthinking memorization of the textbook notions, then the student would follow the "path of least resistance" and would only make a maximum effort and simply learn the social science course by rote.

The designated situation (it can be termed stereotypogenic) was established on the basis of questionnaire questions which were aimed at bringing out whether the student was interested in the social science course, whether he felt a constant lack of time and how the social science courses were usually given in his school. We feel that the method of obtaining information on the last of the mentioned subjects should be of particular interest.

In the questionnaire, the question was asked: "Imagine a conversation between two young persons on the social science lessons in their school. The first young person says: 'In our social science lessons it is usually enough in an articulate and confident manner to reproduce the basic notions of the appropriate paragraph in the textbook and, as a minimum, a grade of 4 is guaranteed!' And the second young person: 'No, we could not get away with that! In the lessons real debates arose on the assigned material and the teacher demanded independent analysis and an independent view!'" Then the respondent was to answer which of the given approaches was similar to the social science lessons at his school.

It might seem that conclusions in this instance would be based on a subjective view. But, in the first place, the given question in the questionnaire does not demand that the respondent evaluate the depth of the knowledge obtained by him and it is merely a matter of assessing the fact. In addition, the poll is always subjectively tinted information which can be relied upon only in the instance that conditions have been created which fully ensure anonymity, confidentiality and so forth. The

numerous (85 percent of the questionnaires) frank answers made the respondents in semiopen questions indicate that in the course of the poll a situation was created needed to obtain reliable information.

The replies to the questions in the "block of a stereotypical situation" were interpreted in the following manner. The respondents who were not interested in the social science course and who felt that they did not have enough time to prepare for the next school day and the students whose teacher was fully satisfied by the mechanical rote learning of the theoretical provisions by the students were considered to be students in whose mind an ideological stereotype had formed. But the respondents studying under a teacher who demanded from them an independent analysis of social processes on the basis of the received theoretical knowledge, regardless of the presence or absence of their feeling of a shortage of time as well as those who to one degree or another were interested in the social science course, these were considered to be students who to a definite degree had learned to analyze social processes independently.

For verifying the above-formulated hypotheses, it was also essential to establish the assessment of the results of learning the material in the social science courses. In methodological terms, this was carried out with the aid of questions which established: a) the opinion of the students on the role of the knowledge obtained in the social science lessons for the young person to realize his goals in life; b) the opinion of the students whether knowledge on social sciences were essential for a non-philosopher scientist; c) the opinion on the role of Marxist theory in the development of the socialist state; d) the desire of the students to deepen their knowledge on social disciplines received in the social science lessons. In the course of analyzing the described empirical material, no attempt was made to construct an index on the basis of the listed questions as they were accounted for separately; in the research presently being prepared provision is made for the constructing of an index.

For verification of the hypotheses, four subfiles were formed using a computer. Subfile 1 included students who had predominantly learned the main provisions of theory by rote in the course of the social science lessons and were well-informed on the contradictory processes in the life of our nation and the capitalist countries; subfile 2 included students who had predominantly learned the theoretical provisions by rote in the course of the social science lessons but were relatively little informed. Subfile 3 included students who to a definite degree had mastered the skills of independent analysis of social processes and here were well informed; subfile 4 included students who to a certain degree had mastered the skills of independent analysis of social processes but were poorly informed.

The following stage in analyzing the primary information was establishing in which of the constructed subfiles a positive assessment of the social science course was widespread.

Table 1 gives data used in verifying hypothesis 1. Thus, the data of Table 1 show that for all the given parameters the students who had learned the provisions of the theory of scientific socialism by rote and here were well informed on the contradictory processes in our nation and in the capitalist countries, more rarely provide positive assessments on the range of questions related to the functioning of the theory of Marxism in our society than do the students who, being well informed, to a definite degree have learned to use the knowledge obtained in the social science lessons for an independent analysis of social processes. This makes it possible to speak of the validity of hypothesis 1.

Table 2 gives data used in verifying the second of the above-named hypotheses. The data indicate that in the group of those who learned the main provisions of theory by rote, in the social science lessons but who are also relatively poorly informed, more frequently positive views are formed on the questions related to the functioning of Marxist theory in our society than among those who have learned the basis of theory by rote but are well informed. Thus, there are grounds also to speak about the validity of hypothesis 2.

Table 2: Distribution of replies from members of subfiles 2 and 1 (in % of number of members of each subfile)

Replies to Questions on Assessing Certain Aspects of the Functioning of Marxist Theory in Society	Subfile 2	Subfile 1
"Knowledge of social science course needed for today's man to realize his goal in life"	33	10
"Low Grades in Social Sciences Should Not Be Considered in Admission to Technical VUZes or to Natural Science Faculties of University":		
1) "Agree"	50	76
2) "More agree than disagree"	39	5
"The concept of 'defense of the socialist fatherland' should include the necessity of defending the theory of Marxism against attempts at its revision"	17	0

The successful empirical verification of the above-formulated hypotheses makes it possible to outline the direction of further work by the MNIK.

Today, as is known, it is particularly important to ensure a direct linkage of the results of theoretical research by social scientists and the process of decision-taking in the party, state and soviet bodies on the basis of alternative approaches. The social scientists have a tool making it possible to realize the given demand. This is simulation modeling using recent-generation computers. And here the first and most important stage in working out a simulation model of the object of control is the creation of its conceptual model. Because of this, the goal of the current stage in the work of the MNIK also is to create a conceptual model for the mechanism of the assimilation of ideology by mass conscience.

What has been stated above indicates that there is every reason to represent the main element of this mechanism as the interaction between the content of the particular experience of people and the results of their perception of a specific ideological action. Then the elaboration of the conceptual model should assume the successive introduction of ever-new factors which determine the particular features of both the perception of the ideological effect as well as the forming of experience.

In working out this conceptual model, a major role is played by the informational sociological model based on the Accorn personal computer and which was previously worked out at the Computer Center of the Academy of Social Sciences Under the CPSU Central Committee (under the leadership of V.N. Lashchinskiy). This makes it possible for the user as he wishes to change the values of one or several parameters, obtaining the corresponding quantitative values on the output. Here the information assembled in the course of the sociological research is used. That is, it is a matter, in essence, of the artificial creation of an entire range of new samples with different set values for the parameters of interest.

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From Payday to Payday

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[Article by Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Mironov, candidate of economic sciences and senior science associate at the Scientific Research Center of the Higher Komsomol School under the Komsomol Central Committee. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] The economic mechanism and the wage system which were in operation prior to the conversion to the new management methods dissipated in the mind of the youth the value of the content of labor and wages. For this reason, there was nothing left for the young men and women except to choose between well-paid work or work that was meaningful and interesting. Moreover, the stereotype of ordinary conscience, in linking the social status of the individual with the level of his prosperity, predetermined a desire to have, if not a very interesting, at least a well-paid job.

Can material remuneration encourage the growth of social production? Under present-day conditions, in our

opinion, this is difficult to expect. Here a negative role is played by certain processes going on in our nation. For example, the average annual inflation rate is 3-4 percent, and the level of the emission of notes in 1988 exceeded the average level of the 11th Five-Year Plan by 4-fold with the volume of the monetary savings of the public exceeding the supplies of material and commodity resources by 5-fold [1]. The real earnings for a significant portion of the public does not make it possible to satisfy needs on a level of the corresponding consumption rates. The income of the population has risen by 38.5 billion rubles, while commodity turnover has increased by only 25 billion [1]. The deficit has grown, prices for individual goods have risen and all of this has led to a higher cost of living.

A young person can be confronted with the question of working in the old manner counting on the established standard of living or working significantly much more efficiently in the hope for a subsequent increase in this. During the 1960s, the income of the population and average monthly earnings of manual and white collar personnel rose by more than 1.5-fold while payments and benefits to the public from the public consumption funds increased by 2.3-fold [2]. In 1986-1987, the wages of manual and white collar personnel rose by an average of 3.8 percent and in 1988, there was a sharp jump with them increasing by 7 percent and reaching 217 rubles. At the same time, for almost 3 million persons, average earnings were under 80 rubles a month while one out of every seven workers in the state sector received an earnings over 300 rubles. According to the estimates of certain specialists, the average minimum wage is 75 rubles a month [3-4]. For almost 40 million persons, the aggregate income is under 75 rubles a month and at the same time for 45 million it is over 200 rubles. In 1987, the number of the population with an average per capita income over 100 rubles a month, in comparison with 1980, increased by 1.4-fold, and those with an income over 150 rubles by 1.9-fold [5-6].

Thus, aggregate income is rising but the share of wages is declining. This shows that benefits from the public consumption funds are increasing. However, not all the workers share these funds equally. For the youth, wages remain the basic source of income as before.

According to the data of the Scientific Research Institute for Labor [7], during the first years of perestroika, some 17.6 percent of the respondents received a wage of less than 120 rubles a month, 29.2 percent received from 121 to 160 rubles and 30.6 percent earned over 200 rubles. Here the average per capita income was: under 70 rubles for 15.6 percent of the respondents and over 200 rubles for 8.6 percent (see the Table).

Level of Prosperity and Amount of Per Capita Income

Level of Prosperity	Average Per Capita Income, Rubles				
	To 50	51-100	101-150	151-200	Over 200
I live from payday to payday	41.5	20.9	7.4	6.2	11.5
I have enough for daily expenses	29.3	36.7	30.5	18.6	19.0
Basically enough money	28.0	37.0	46.5	42.5	39.1
I can afford everything except a car	1.2	4.3	12.8	26.1	17.9
I can afford everything	—	1.1	2.8	6.6	12.5

Clearly, precisely an income of 200 rubles per person makes it possible to emerge on a new level of satisfying demand [7]. This is also the real minimum wage and not those mythical 75 rubles which, one does not know how, have become the minimum wage.

How have earnings and average per capita income changed when a majority of the enterprises began operating under the new management conditions? Our research¹ has shown that 4.8 percent of those questioned earned under 100 rubles, 19.2 percent earned 101-150 rubles, 22.7 percent received 151-200 rubles, 25.1 percent received 201-250 rubles and 28.2 percent received over 250 rubles. But the average per capita income was: 5.5 percent had under 50 rubles, 13.0 percent received 51-70 rubles and 4.9 percent received over 200 rubles. Consequently, there is an increased number of employees who have an income within the limits of 70 rubles, while at the same time the number of employees with an income over 200 rubles has declined.

The wages of young workers are differentiated depending upon their skill as well as upon the sector and the region. Even in the same work places, wages can vary, since there are advantageous and disadvantageous jobs. For example, the earnings of piece workers are significantly higher than time workers.

The conversion of the enterprises to cost accounting has not eliminated the shortcomings inherent to the old economic mechanism. As before, the principle of distribution according to labor is not observed. Thus, 20.1 percent of the respondents pointed out that as before they employ the leveling approach in setting wages and they do not consider the individual contribution of each employee; some 21.7 percent feel that their wages are low and only 8.6 percent assumes that their wages are high. The paradox is that the enterprise has converted to cost accounting but the main production unit (brigade, section or shop) continues to work in the old manner.

Earnings which are viewed as unjust cause reduced labor activeness. The employees who feel that their labor is not being fully paid for assume that their wages must be increased with 14.4 percent wanting an increase of 1/3, 1 out of 10 by 50 percent and 1 out of 5 by double. These data point to the readiness of the young workers to increase labor efficiency if labor is correctly organized and earnings will depend upon the labor contribution. The absence of a realistic linkage between the amount of

earnings and the personal labor contribution gives rise to a sensation of unjust wages among a significant portion of the youth.

The research of 1989 indicates that the young workers under the age of 30 receive an average of 120-140 rubles, that is, less than in any other age group [8]. The young people are not satisfied by such a situation and such wages do not encourage them to work at full force. The presence of unused reserves can also be seen by the results of sociological research conducted by the Scientific Research Center of the Higher Komsomol School Under the Komsomol Central Committee. Thus, 18.7 percent of those questioned pointed out that, in working at full tilt but under the condition of the conformity of earnings to the personal contribution, they could produce 50 percent more product than at present, while 17.3 percent said output could double. All the same, the young workers are hopeful that the situation will change in the next few years. Our poll indicates that 39 percent of the young people under the age of 30 are hoping for an improvement in their material situation, 11 percent feel that it is deteriorating, in the opinion of 23 percent the situation has not changed, while 27 percent found it difficult to say anything.

For the young workers, bonuses are an important means of material incentive since, as was pointed out, payments from the public consumption funds are less accessible for them. Often one hears that wages are low but on the other hand I constantly receive bonuses. The very fact of the existence of bonuses is viewed as something permanent and not dependent upon the labor contribution. People have become accustomed to seeing a bonus as an obligatory addition to wages. Incidentally, it is very difficult to ensure the payment of a bonus to each person in terms of actual results of labor. In the opinion of the respondents, the distribution of bonuses is determined by many factors and 25.7 percent feel that everything depends upon the quality of its work, 23.1 percent upon the fulfillment of the personal plan and 41.4 percent upon the fulfillment of the plan by the collective. One out of 4 feels that the receiving of a bonus depends upon relations with the management and upon the attitude of the latter. This is an alarming symptom.

Our research has shown that over 1/2 of those questioned (52.8 percent) was not satisfied with the bonus system and it was acceptable for only 21.9 percent. Of undoubted interest are the factors why the young

workers are not satisfied with the bonuses. Thus, 26 percent feels that the bonuses are given out independently of how someone worked; 32.6 percent noted that the bonuses are paid in small amounts and 24.3 percent felt they were paid too rarely. One out of three feels that no one knows for what he himself and his comrades at work received the bonuses. All of this shows that the current form of encouraging labor has not proven itself and it is imperfect. In our opinion, it must be either fundamentally altered or completely eliminated.

In summing up, it is essential to point out the following: the material situation of the young people and other employee categories differs markedly: 120-140 rubles for the young people and 217 rubles as an average for those employed in industry. A new economic mechanism has still not been worked out and for this reason to some degree the situation of the young workers has even deteriorated. They more than others are subject to dismissal and cutbacks (some 20.3 percent of the respondents pointed to this), they lose in earnings (17.8 percent) and this leads to increased labor and social passivity (14.2 percent).

An important condition for improving the standard of living of the employees should be a socially just distribution of money from the public consumption funds. For this, a greater orientation to the youth is essential.

Footnote

1. The research was carried out by the Scientific Research Center of the Higher Komsomol School Under the Komsomol Central Committee in 1988 at the nation's industrial enterprises operating under cost accounting conditions. A total of 1,529 persons was questioned, including 35 percent young people under the age of 30.

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